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ABSTRACT
We study the effects of differences in local financial development within an integrated financial
market. To do so, we construct a new indicator of financial development by estimating a regional effect
on the probability that, ceteris paribus, a household is shut off from the credit market. By using this
indicator we find that financial development enhances the probability an individual starts his own
business, favors entry, increases competition, and promotes growth of firms. As predicted by theory, these
effects are weaker for larger firms, which can more easily raise funds outside of the local area. Overall,
the results suggest local financial development is an important determinant of the economic success of
an area even in an environment where there are no frictions to capital movements.
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Since the seminal work of King and Levine (1993), a large body of empirical evidence
has shown that a country’s level of financial development impacts its ability to grow.
1 Much of
this evidence, however, comes from a period when cross-border capital movements were very
limited. In the last decade, international capital mobility has exploded. Private capital flow to
emerging market economies have grown from close to nothing in the 1970s, to 170 billion in the
1980s, to 1.3 trillions in the 1990s.
2 During the same period the amount of U.S. private equity
money invested abroad and the number of foreign firms listed in the United States have
experienced a similar growth rate. The phenomenon is so dramatic that many countries have
started wondering whether they need a national stock market once their firms can list on
NASDAQ.
In light of these dramatic changes, the question of whether national financial institutions
and markets still matter for growth once domestic agents have access to foreign markets has
become very important from a policy perspective. Unfortunately, it is a difficult question to
answer empirically. The integration of national financial markets is so recent that we lack a
sufficiently long time series to estimate its impact in the data. At the same time, the pace of
integration is so fast that if we were to establish that national financial development mattered for
national growth during the last decade, we could not confidently extrapolate this result to the
current decade.
To try and assess the relevance for growth of national financial institutions and markets
in an increasingly integrated capital market we follow a different approach. Rather than studying
the effect of financial development across countries we study the effect of local financial
development within a single country, which has being unified, from both a political and a
regulatory point of view, for the last 140 years: Italy. The level of integration reached within Italy
                                               
1 See for instance, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Beckert and Harvey (2001)
etc.  and Levine et al.3
probably represents an upper bound for the level of integration international financial markets can
reach. Hence, if we find that local financial development matters for growth within Italy, we can
safely conclude national financial development will continue to matter for national growth in the
foreseeable future. Of course, the converse is not true. If we do not find the effect within Italy, it
is still possible that the effect is present across countries.
Moving the focus from cross-country comparisons to within country analysis exacerbates
some of the problems also present in the cross-country analysis. First, how to properly measure
financial development. Measures such as stock market capitalization to GDP or stock market
turnover to GDP make no sense when applied at the local level. We address this problem by
developing a new indicator, which enables us to measure financial development at the local level,
relying on the theoretically-sound notion that developed financial markets grant individuals and
firms an easier access to external funds.
Second, cross-country comparisons assume that differences in financial development are
exogenously determined. This assumption becomes more questionable when we move to within
country differences: across countries one can hope that exogenous differences in history, culture,
and regulation drive differences in financial development. This is harder to imagine within a
country (although not necessarily in Italy, where different regions experienced a very different
history). We address this problem by instrumenting our indicator with exogenous factors that in
previous work (see Guiso et al., 2001) have been demonstrated to have an impact on financial
development.
But moving the focus from cross-country comparisons to within country analysis also
provides new opportunities. Rather than restricting our analysis to the macro effect of financial
development we also study its micro effects, showing its impact on individual households and
firms. We then study how this micro effect translates into a macro effect. If financial
development affects economic growth by facilitating the creation of new firms, it must be the
                                                                                                                                           
2 See for example Friedman (1999).4
case that in more financially developed areas it is easier for an individual to become an
entrepreneur and, at the same time, these areas should experience a higher rate of new firms’
creation.  In doing so, we provide additional support to the causal link between finance and
growth, showing the mechanisms through which this link operates.
We find strong effects of local financial development. Ceteris paribus an individual’s
odds of starting a business increases by 33 percent if he moves from the least financially
developed region to the most financially developed one. Furthermore, he is able to do so at a
younger age. As a result, on average entrepreneurs are 5.6 years younger in the most financially
developed region than in the least financially developed one. Similarly, the ratio of new firms to
population is three percentage point higher in the most financially developed provinces than in
the least financially developed, and the number of existing firms divided by population 50%
higher. In more financially developed regions firms exceed the rate of growth that can be
financed internally 75% more than in the least financially developed ones. Interestingly, this
effect is entirely concentrated among small and medium firms. This is consistent with the view
that larger firms can easily raise funds outside of the area they are located in.  Finally, in the most
financially developed region per capita GDP grows 1% per annum more than in the least
financially developed one.
Overall all the evidence suggests that local financial development plays an important role
even in a perfectly integrated market. Hence, finance effects are not likely to disappear as the
world become more integrated or as Europe becomes unified.
While there is a large literature on financial development and growth across countries
(see the excellent survey by Levine (1997)), the only paper we know of that studies within
country differences is Jayaratne and Strahan (1996). Using the de-regulation of banking in
different states of the United States between 1972 and 1991 as a proxy for a quantum jump in
financial development, they show that annual growth rates in a state increased by 0.51 to 1.19
percentage points a year after de-regulation.  In a sense, this paper already shows that local5
financial development matters. It does that, however, in a financial market that was not perfectly
integrated yet. In fact, during their sample period there were still differences in banking
regulation across states and interstate branching was restricted. By contrast, none of these two
imperfections is present within Italy.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the data. Section 2
introduces our measure of financial development and discusses its robustness. Section 3 analyzes
the effects of financial development on firms’ creation and section 4 on firms’ and aggregate
growth. Section 5 explores whether the impact of local financial development on firm’s mark-up
and growth differs as a function of the size of the firm, as predicted by theory.
1.  Data Description
Data Used
We use three datasets. The first one, containing information about households, is the Survey
of Households Income and Wealth (SHIW). This survey, which is conducted by the Bank of Italy
on a representative sample of about 8,000 households, collects detailed information on Italian
household income, consumption, and wealth as well as their portfolio allocation across financial
instruments and their access to formal and informal credit. For each household, the data also
contain information on characteristics of the households' head, such as education, age, place of
birth, and residence. Table 1a reports the summary statistics for this sample.
An interesting characteristic of this dataset is that each household is asked the following
two questions: “During the year did you or a member of the household apply for a loan or a
mortgage from a bank or other financial intermediary and was your application turned down?"
and “During the year did you or a member of the household think of applying for a loan or a
mortgage to a bank or other financial intermediary, but then changed your mind on the
expectation that the application would have been turned down?". 1% of the sample households
were turned down (i.e. answered yes to the first question), while 2% were discouraged from6
borrowing (i.e. answered yes to the second question). We create the variable ``discouraged or
turned down" equals to one if a household responds positively to at least one of the two questions
reported above and zero otherwise.
The SHIW also contains information about the profession of different individuals. Table
1b reports summary statistics for the individuals in the SHIW household sample.
3 About 12% of
the individuals in the sample were self-employed and the same percentage had received a transfer
from their parents.
We collected the second dataset, containing information at the province level on the
number of registered firms, their rate of formation, and the incidence of bankruptcy among them,
from a yearly edition of “Il Sole 24 Ore”, a financial newspaper. These are the newspapers’
elaboration of data coming from the Italian Statistical Institute (ISTAT). Table 1c reports
summary statistics for these data.
The third dataset contains financial information about firms. It is from  Centrale dei
Bilanci (CB), which provides standardized data on the balance sheets and income statements of
about 30,000 Italian non-financial firms. Data, available since 1982, are collected by a
consortium of banks interested in pooling information about their clients. A firm is included in
the sample if it borrows from at least one of the banks in the consortium. The database is highly
representative of the Italian non-financial sector: a recent report (Centrale dei Bilanci (1992)),
based on a sample of 12,528 companies drawn from the database (including only the companies
continuously present in 1982-90 and with sales in excess of 1 billion Lire in 1990), states that this
sample covers 57 percent of the sales reported in national accounting data. In particular, this
dataset contains a lot of small (less than 50 employees) and medium (between 50 and 250) firms.
Table 1d reports summary statistics for these data.
                                               
3 Since the sample is stratified by households and not by individuals, when we sample by individuals
certain groups are over represented. For example, more people live in the South in this sample than in the
household sample, reflecting the fact that the average family size is larger in the south. The age is smaller
than the household sample age, because we deliberately truncated age at 60.7
2. Our Indicator of Financial Development
Methodology
One of the main roles of the financial system is to transfer funds from agents with a
surplus of resources to agents whose investment opportunities exceed their current resources. If
we equate the development of a financial system with its degree of efficiency in performing this
task, we could measure its development by estimating how well funds are transferred. A good
indicator would be the ease with which individuals in need of external funds can access them and
the premium they have to pay for these funds. In practice, both these avenues are quite difficult.
We do not normally observe when individuals or firms are shut off from the credit market, but
only whether they borrow or not. Similarly, we do not normally have information on the rate at
which they borrow, let alone the rate at which they should have borrowed in absence of any
friction. For all these reasons, the studies of the effects of financial development (e.g., King and
Levine (1993), Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Rajan and Zingales (1998a)) have used alternative
measures. An exception is represented by periods of financial crises, where as a proxy for
individual access to funds one can use the number of bank failures (e.g., Bernanke, 1983).
Fortunately, the Italian Survey of Households Income and Wealth asks households
whether they have been denied credit or have been discouraged from applying. Hence, it contains
information on individuals’ access to credit even during normal periods, i.e., outside of a banking
crisis. Furthermore, unlike the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey, the SHIW contains precise
information on the location of the respondents. Controlling for individual characteristics, it is
possible, thus, to obtain a local indicator of how more likely an individual is to obtain credit in
one area of the country, rather than in a different one.  This indicator measures how easy it is for
an individual to borrow at a local level.
This approach, however, begs the question of what drives differences in financial
development across Italian regions. If demand for financial development generates its own8
supply, the regions with the best economic prospects might have the most financially developed
banking system, biasing the results of our analysis. For this reason, we will instrument our
indicator of financial development with exogenous determinants of the degree of financial
development such as the level of judicial inefficiency and the level of social capital.
While both these factors are likely to be exogenous with respect to economic and
financial development, they might have a direct effect (or be a proxy for a variable that has a
direct effect) on our variables of interest. This problem is likely to be more severe for social
capital than for judicial inefficiency, since there is some evidence (e.g., Knack and Kneefer,
(1996)) that social capital has a direct effect on economic performance. For this reason we report
both the regressions with only judicial inefficiency as an instrument, which we regard as more
robust to this criticism, and the regression with both sets of variables as instrument. Moreover, we
try to minimize the severity of the problem inserting in the regression variables that might capture
the direct effect. For example, the local level of economic delinquency that might have a direct
impact on economic performance affects our measures of judicial inefficiency. To eliminate this
possible spurious correlation of the instrument, we control for the level of delinquency in our
regressions.
Does the Local Market Matter?
One could object that such indicator of financial development is not very useful in so
much as it measures a local condition of the credit market. If individuals and firms can tap
markets other than the local one, local market conditions become irrelevant.
There is a growing literature, however, documenting that distance matters in the
provisions of funds, especially for small firms. Petersen and Rajan (2002), for instance,
documents the importance of distance in the provision of bank credit to small firms. They also
argue that such importance has been decreasing in recent years, thanks to the availability of more
information. Since Italy lags behind the United States in this dimension, we expect distance to9
still be important. Similarly, Lerner (1995) documents the importance of distance in the venture
capital market.
That distance is an important barrier to lending is very much consistent also with the
practitioners’ view.  The president of the Italian Association of Bankers (ABI) declared in a
conference that the banker’s rule of thumb is to never lend to a client located more than three
miles from his office.
Overall, this discussion suggests that distance may segment local markets. Whether it
does it in practice, it is ultimately an empirical matter. If local market conditions do not matter,
then the geographical dummies should not have a statistically significant impact on the
probability of being denied a loan, a proposition we will test. Similarly, if markets are not
segmented our measure of local financial development should have no impact on any real
variable, another proposition we will test.
 Finally, the above discussion provides an additional testable implication. If local market
conditions matter, they should matter the most for small firms, which have difficulty in raising
funds at a distance, than for large firms. Thus, analyzing the effect of our indicator by different
size classes will help test whether the effect we find is spurious or not.
What Is the Relevant Local Market?
Italy is currently divided in 20 regions and 103 provinces.
4 What is the relevant local
market? According to the Italian Antitrust authority the ''relevant market'' in banking for antitrust
purposes is the province, a geographic entity very similar to a US county.  Furthermore, until
1990 banks could not open new branches without a Central Bank’s permission. New
authorizations were granted province-by-province, on the basis of an evaluation of the total
number of branches already operating in each province.  Thus, from an economic point of view
the natural unit of analysis is the province.
                                               
4 The number of provinces has recently increased. During our sample period there were 95 provinces.10
There are, however, some statistical considerations. Since we need to estimate the
probability of rejection, which is a fairly rare event (3% of the entire sample and 14% in the
sample of households who looked for credit), we need a sufficiently large number of observations
in each local market. If we divide the 39,827 observations by province, we have on average only
387 observations per province and less than 200 observations in almost a third of the provinces.
Therefore, we will be estimating each indicator on the basis of very few denials (on average 12).
This casts doubt on the statistical reliability of the indicator. In fact, when we estimate the
indicator at the provincial level 22% of the provincial indicators are not statistically significant.
More importantly, when we divide the sample into two and estimate the provincial effect on the
probability of being shut off the credit market prior and after 1994, the correlation between the
indicators estimated in the first period and that estimated in the second period is only 0.14 and it
is not statistically significant. As a result, we focus on the results at the regional level.     
Description of our results
Our goal is to identify differences in the supply of credit. The probability a household is
rejected or discouraged depends both on the frequency with which households demand credit and
on the odds a demand for credit is rejected. To isolate this latter effect, we would like to have the
set of people who were interest in raising funds. We do not have this information, but we can
approximate this set by pooling all the households that have some debt with the household we
know have been turned down for a loan or discouraged from applying.
5  This group represents 20
percent of the entire sample, with an incidence of discouraged/turned down equal to 14 percent.
For ease of interpretation we estimate a linear probability model of the likelihood a
household is shut off from the credit market. Each year we classify a household as shut off if it
reports it has been rejected for a loan application or discouraged from applying that year. As
                                               
5 Note that any residual demand effect will only bias us against finding any real effect of financial
development. In fact, demand is likely to be higher in more dynamic regions. Thus, if we do not perfectly
control for demand we will have that more dynamic regions are incorrectly classified as more constraints.11
control variables we use several households’ characteristics: household income, household wealth
(linear and squared), household head's age, his/her education (number of years of schooling), the
number of people belonging to the household, the number of kids, and indicator variables for
whether the head is married, is a male, for the industry in which he/she works, and for the level of
job he/she has. To capture possible regional differences in the riskiness of potential borrowers we
control in this regression for the percentage of firms that go bankrupt (average of the 1992-1998
period).  In addition we have calendar year dummies and a dummy for every region.
Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates of these regional dummies in ascending order.
We drop the smallest region (Val d’Aosta) because it has only 10 households in the sample at risk
and none rationed. In all the other regions the local dummy is positive and statistically significant
at the 1% level. The magnitude of these coefficients, however, covers a wide range. The region
with the lowest conditional rate of rejection (Marche) has a rejection rate that is exactly half of
the rejection rate of the least financially developed region (Campania). As one can see from Table
2, financially underdeveloped regions tend to be in the South. Nevertheless, the correlation is not
very high (0.27). This will allow us to separate the effect of a pure South dummy from the effect
of financial underdevelopment. This might be over controlling, because the backwardness of the
South, we will argue, can at least in part be attributed to its financial underdevelopment.
Nevertheless, it is useful to show that the effects we find are not entirely explained by a South
dummy.
We will use this conditional probability of being rejected as a measure of financial
underdevelopment. For ease of interpretation, however, we transform this variable, so that
becomes an indicator of financial development, not underdevelopment. Therefore, we compute
1 – Conditional Probability of Rejection/ Max {Conditional Probability of
Rejection}.
                                                                                                                                           
This distortion will reduce the possibility the correlation between financial development and any measure
of economic performance.12
This normalized measure of financial development, which we will use in the rest of the paper, is
reported in the third column of Table 2.
Reality check of the results
Before we use this indicator, we need to show it is sensible. We do so in three ways.
First, we show that it is very stable over time. While financial development is not necessarily
constant over time, it is unlikely to change rapidly either. Second, we show that it is highly
correlated with likely determinants of the level of financial development. Finally, we show that it
is correlated with commonly used measures of financial developments. In this last case we do not
expect the correlation to be too high. If it were, then our new methodology to estimate financial
development would not be adding very much. These correlations, thus, should be seen both as a
validation of our measure and as an assessment of the quality of existing measures.
To test the stability over time we divide the sample in two and we re-estimate the same
regression over the period 1989-93 and 1995-98. Since in each of the estimation we use only half
of the observations, these estimates are significantly noisier than the ones we use in the rest of the
paper. Nevertheless, the correlation between the regional indicators of financial development
obtained in the first period and the second one is very high (0.98), significant at the 1% level.
  Our indicator is also highly correlated with likely determinants of financial development.
It is negatively correlated with our two measures of court inefficiency: the average duration of a
first degree trial (-0.40) and the number of pending trials scaled by population (-0.75), significant
at the 1% level. It is also positively correlated with all the measures of social capital that, as GSZ
(2001) show, affects the local availability and use of financial contracts: 0.57 with electoral
turnout (significant at the 1% level), 0.47 with blood donation (significant at the 0.1% level), 0.30
with the incidence of cooperatives (significant only at the 23% level). Our measures of judicial
inefficiency, which we will use as instrument, can explain 66 percent of the regional variation in
financial development by themselves and 69 percent together with the social capital measures.13
Our indicator is also correlated with other traditional indicators of financial development.
Its correlation with number of bank branches divided by population is positive (0.36) and
statistically significant at the 1% level. Similarly, it is negatively correlated with the spread
between lending rates and borrowing rates  (-0.63), significant at the 1% level. The correlation
with the ratio of loans to GDP is positive (0.15), but not statistically significant. We think this
reflects the shortcomings of the traditional measure, rather than of our new indicators.
Finally, as an alternative measure of financial development we use an indicator of the
importance of usury. Usury, which is a direct consequence of financial underdevelopment, is an
endemic problem in Italy. A special Parliamentary commission has done an inquiry on the topic
and has produced an indicator of how important the phenomenon is in different provinces. This
indicator is computed using 17 variables, including the number of police reports, arrests for usury
etc. As expected, the importance of usury is negatively correlated with our indicator of financial
development (-0.65), statistically significant at the 1% level.
In sum, all the evidence seems to suggest that our indicator of financial development
captures significant differences in the efficiency of the financial market at the local level.
Possible Objections
While our indicator of financial development tries to implement the theoretically correct
measure and produces economically sensible estimates, it is not immune from potential
criticisms.  Here we try to confront the major ones.
By construction our financial development indicator picks up all geographical
characteristics that are correlated with the probability a household is denied a loan or is
discouraged from applying. For example, GSZ (2001) show that Italian provinces differ greatly in
their level of judicial efficiency and social capital. Thus, our measure of financial development
also captures these local characteristics as they affect the supply of credit.
Yet, we do not regard this as a problem. In this paper we are not concerned about the
causes of financial development (or lack of there of), but about its effects. If, for instance, social14
capital affects the availability of credit, we do want to capture this effect as well and the estimated
coefficient of the regional dummy achieves this objective: it captures the combined effect that all
the local variables have on the availability of credit. Of course, when we estimate the effects of
financial development on our variables of interest we might want to control for some of these
variables as well, because we do not want to attribute to financial development some  direct
effects that social capital might have on our variables of interest. For example, it is well possible
that social capital might have a direct negative effect on creation of firms, beyond its indirect
effect via the credit market.
A regional dummy might also capture any geographical clustering of individual
characteristics that makes somebody a good or a bad borrower. While we try to control for these
differences inserting in the regression the actual default rate, we might still have unobservable
differences. Let’s assume, for instance, that households in Catania are on average more dishonest
than those in Padua. Then, for given individual characteristics a banker will be less willing to lend
to a household in Catania than in Padua. Do we want to interpret this difference as a difference in
financial development?
Our answer is positive, as long as this discrimination is based on individual
characteristics that are unobservable both to the econometrician  and to the banker, and are
presumed on the basis of geographical attribute. Under this assumption, an individual with the
same characteristics (including unobservable honesty) will receive more credit in Padua than in
Catania. Thus, ceteris paribus access to credit in Catania is worse and, thus, according to our
definition Catania’s level of financial development is lower.
On the other hand, the answer would be negative if the discrimination is based on
individual characteristics unobservable to the econometrician but observed by the banker.
Consider, for instance, the case that Catania’s inhabitants are on average less energetic than
Padua’s and such a difference is visible to the banker, but not to the econometrician. In such a
case we would record that Catania’s inhabitants have less access to credit even if two individuals15
with the same characteristics (including individual energy) receive the same amount of credit in
Padua and in Catania. In this case, we would not like to use the fact that for given observable
characteristics more households get denied credit in Catania as evidence that Catania’s financial
market is less developed, especially because this approach might incorrectly attribute to financial
development some effects it does not have. For example, less energetic individuals are less likely
to become entrepreneur, regardless of their access to credit.  By using our geographical indicator
of financial development, the effect of individual energy on entrepreneurship might appear as an
effect of “financial development” on entrepreneurship.
To avoid this problem we will instrument our measure of financial development with its
determinants, such as the level of judicial inefficiency. Since there are no obvious reasons why
our measures of judicial inefficiency (average duration of a trial and number of pending trials
divided by population) should be correlated with the level of individual energy, we think they
represent good instruments.
Finally, it is possible that individuals appear more rationed in a certain area simply
because of a temporary surge in the demand of credit, driven by local idiosyncratic factors. These
local shocks increasing the demand for credit can be either negative or positive. We try to control
for these negative shocks (like the crisis of the textile industry in Prato) by inserting in the
regression the average rate of default in the area. By contrast, we are not too worried about
positive shocks (such as a surge of investment opportunities in an area). By raising the odds of
being rationed, these shocks would lead us to misclassify areas with a lot of investment
opportunities as financial underdeveloped.  This distortion in our indicator will bias against
finding any real effect of financial development on entrepreneurship, new entry and growth.
2.  Effects of financial development on firms’ creations
Our first interest is the impact of financial development on economic mobility. We start
from a very micro level: how does the degree of financial development affect the probability an16
individual start his own business? We then complement this evidence with more aggregate data
on the rate of firms’ creation in a province. Finally, we look at whether differences in the ease of
entry induced by differences in financial development have also impact on the degree of
competition. Since in all these regressions our main variable of interest (financial development)
varies only at the regional level, we correct the standard errors for the possible dependence of the
residuals within regional clusters.
Effects on the probability of starting a business
The SHIW contains information about people’s occupation. In particular, it identifies
individuals who are self-employed. This is a broad category that includes bona fide entrepreneurs,
both in the industrial and the retail sectors, professionals (doctors and lawyers), artisans,
plumbers, electricians, etc. While the financing needs of these different occupations differ wildly,
it is safe to say that all of them require access to financing more than working as an employee.
For this reason we start our analysis focusing on the broader category. We exclude from the
population “at risk” to become self-employed students, pre-school children, retirees  (people older
than 60), people unable to work because invalid, and military.
As control variables we use a combination of both individuals’ characteristics
and regional characteristics. As individual characteristics we use a person’s age, his level of
education, his sex, and a dummy variable equal to 1 if a household received an intergenerational
transfer. 
6 We also insert two local characteristics, both measured at the provincial level.
First, we use the level of per capita GDP, as a measure of economic development of the
area. Since higher level of per capita income is also associated with higher level of per capita
capital, this latter variable can also be interpreted in the context of Lucas’ (1978) model of
occupational choice and size of firms. Higher level of per capita capital boosts the productivity of
                                               
6 We do not control for the level of wealth because this is endogenous. In spite of this objection, we tried
inserting it and the results were very similar.17
employees, making it relatively more attractive for an individual to be employed. Thus, we expect
the sign of per capital GDP to be negative.
Second, we try to control for a measure of people’s willingness to commit fraud. To this
purpose we use an Italian institutional feature. In Italy all checking accounts have an over drafting
protection for small amounts. But if a check substantially exceeds this over drafting protection the
bank calls the client and urges him to provide funds immediately. If he does not do it, his act of
knowingly writing a check with insufficient funds is considered a fraud, which is a crime
punishable with jail. We use the number of such reports per inhabitant as a measure of people
willingness to commit fraud.
Table 3a reports the results. Column I reports the probit estimates of the impact of these
variables on the probability an individual is self-employed.  In more financially developed
regions the probability a person becomes self-employed is indeed higher, and this effect is
statistically different from zero at the 1% level. The effect is also economically significant.
Moving from Campania (the most financially underdeveloped region according to our indicator)
to Marche (the most financially developed) increases a person’s probability to start his own
business by 4 percentage points, equal to 33% of the sample mean. This result is also consistent
with the literature on liquidity constraints and entrepreneurship.
7
The individual characteristics have mostly the expected effect. Older people are more
likely to start their own business and so are male. Not surprisingly, a transfer also significantly
raises the probability of starting a business. More surprising it is the negative and statistically
significant impact of education. This result, however, is coherent with what Evans and Jovanovic
(1989) find for the United States.
Column II re-estimates the same specification inserting a dummy variable equal to one
for regions located in the South of Italy. While this is over controlling (part of what is different18
about the South is the lower level of financial development), it is important to ascertain the effect
we found is not simply a North-South difference. And column II shows it is not. Individuals
located in the South are significantly less likely to start their own business, but only marginally so
(a 0.1 percent drop in the probability, equal to 1 percent of the sample mean). Introducing a
Southern region dummy only minimally impacts the size of the coefficient of financial
development.
 One possible objection is that our indicator of financial development is measured with
noise. To address this problem in Columns IV we instrument our indicator with two alternative
measures of the efficiency of the local financial system. One is the importance of usury. This
indicator is computed using 17 variables, including the number of police reports, arrests for usury
etc. The second one is the fraction of total bank loans granted by local institutions.
8 This is a
measure of the strength of local institutions, which tend to lend to smaller firms, vis-à-vis national
institutions, which lend to larger firms with access to fund outside the local areas. For ease of
comparison, column III reports the corresponding OLS estimates.
As to be expected in the case of a variable measured with error, the coefficient with
instrumental variable is bigger than the OLS counterpart and remains statistically different from
zero.
 Another objection is that both financial development and entrepreneurship are driven by
a third unobservable factor. To resolve this problem we need to find an instrument that is likely to
be correlated with financial development, but not directly with entrepreneurship. One such
instrument could be the quality of the local judicial system. Since in our specification we have a
measure of crime, this should capture any direct effect that judicial inefficiency might have on
economic activity. Hence, in column V we instrument financial development with two measures
                                                                                                                                           
7 For example, Evans and Jovanovic (1989) find that individuals with more assets are more likely to
become self-employed. Holtz, Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen (1994a, 1994b) find that individuals that receive
intergenerational transfers from their parents are more likely to succeed in running small businesses.
8 Local institutions are defined banks that are not present in more than five provinces.19
of judicial inefficiency: the average duration of a first degree trial and the number of pending
trials scaled by population.
The coefficient of financial development is similar to the OLS one (24 percent smaller),
but the standard error almost doubles, thus we lose statistical significance at the conventional
level (p value of 11 percent).
As we have shown in GSZ (2001), there exists another important determinant of financial
development besides judicial inefficiency: the level of social capital of a certain area. The only
problem in using this instrument is that social capital, through its effect on cooperation, might
have a direct effect on an individual’s ability to start a business. Since we have three measures of
social capital (electoral turnout, blood donation, and frequency of cooperatives) we can use the
first two measures as instruments and the third one, which is the most direct measure of people
willingness to cooperate for economic purposes, as a control variable.
This is what we do in column VI. The magnitude of the coefficient of financial
development is now above the OLS estimate and it is statistically significant at the 5% level.
In Table 3.B we focus on a narrower definition of entrepreneurs. Thus, we exclude from
the sample all professionals (doctors and lawyers), artisans, plumbers, electricians, etc. So
defined, the odds of being an entrepreneur is only 3 percent. As a result, our estimates become
more imprecise, but the overall pattern of the results is the same.
Effects on the age at which people become entrepreneurs
 Another way to test whether the improved access to funds brought by financial
development affects the opportunity to become an entrepreneur is to look at the average age of
entrepreneurs in different areas. Better access to funds should allow people to become
entrepreneurs at a younger age, hence in more financially developed the average age of existing
entrepreneurs should be lower
In Table 4 we test this proposition. We restrict our attention to the more narrow definition
of entrepreneur, because it is the least distorted by subsidies. For instance, there are a lot of20
subsidies to encourage younger generations to become artisans and these subsidies are not
homogenous across different regions. Using this definition, however, we compute the average age
of entrepreneurs in each province and then regress this average on the level of economic and
financial development of each province. As column I shows, more financially developed regions
have younger entrepreneurs on average, and this effect is statistically significant. Moving from
the least financially developed region to the most financially developed one decreases the average
age of entrepreneurs by 5.5 years. This effect is robust to controlling for Southern regions
(column II) and to using instrumental variables (column III and V).
Effects on the entry on new firms
If financial development increases the likelihood an individual start a business, it should
also increase the aggregate rate of firms’ formation and, overall, the number of existing firms.
Table 5 tests these predictions.
Table 5A analyzes the creation of new firms. The dependent variable is the fraction of
new firms registered in a province during a year scaled by the number of inhabitants. It is an
average for the period 1992-98.  The explanatory variables are: our indicator of financial
development in the region, the per capita GDP in the province and the level of economic
delinquency. As column 1 shows, financial development favors the formation of new firms and
this effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. Moving from the least financially developed
region to the most financially developed one increases the ratio of new firms to population by .48,
roughly one firm every 200 inhabitants. This result is consistent with Black and Strahan (2001)
that find that in the U.S. competition in the banking market is associated with higher level of new
incorporations because banking competition leads to more credit availability. Our result provides
evidence of the direct link between credit availability and firms’ creation.21
   Interestingly, unlike the result of the micro regression the effect of per capita GDP is
negative and statistically significant, as predicted by Lucas’s (1978) model. Economic
delinquency has a negative effect on firm creation, but this is not statistically different from zero.
Inserting the South dummy (column II) does not alter the results. The dummy itself has a
negative coefficient, which is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Finally, in columns
III and V we instrument our indicator of financial development: in column III with alternative
measure of financial development, in column IV with our measures of judicial inefficiency, and
in column V with both judicial inefficiency and social capital. The magnitude of the coefficient of
financial development remains similar in level and retains statistical significance at the 5 percent
level.
Table 5B analyzes the number of firms present in a province per 100 people living in the
same area. Our dependent variable is an average of this indicator for the period 1996-98.  As
column I shows, more financially developed areas have more firms. The difference between the
most and the least financially developed region can explain a difference of 3 firms per 100
people, equal to almost two standard deviations in numbers of registered firms.
Column II inserts a dummy for the Southern regions. This dummy has a negative and
statistically significant impact on the level of firms. Once we account for Southern regions, the
magnitude of the impact of financial development drops by 30 percent but remains statistically
significant. The estimates obtained using instrumental variables are similar (Column III and V),
but the standard deviations almost double. As a result, the estimate obtained using only the
measures of judicial inefficiency, as instrument is not statistically significant at conventional
levels, while the other is.
Effects on the competition in the local market
Thus far, we have shown that in financially developed regions people can more easily
start a business and this leads to a higher rate of entry of new firms and also a higher number of22
firms overall. Does this have any major economic consequence? The obvious place to look at is
profit margins. Does this higher rate of entry lead to lower profit margins?
To answer this question we use our third dataset, containing firms’ balance sheets
information. Since we have information only where a firm is located and not where it sells its
product, we need to assume that there is some degree of correlation between its location and the
market it operates in.  This assumption is fairly realistic given we are mostly talking about small
firms.
We measure the mark up as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization
divided by output. We regress this measure on our indicator of financial development and a series
of control variables. To control for industry specific characteristics we insert eighteen industry
dummies. Then, we control for firm size, calendar year dummies, per capita GDP, and level of
economic delinquency. The results are contained in Table 6.
As column I shows, firms in more financially developed regions have a smaller mark up.
According to this estimate, firms in the most financially developed region have a mark up 1.6
percentage points lower than in the least financially developed region, i.e., 29 percent below the
sample mean. Thus, the effect is both statistically and economically significant. This effect is
robust to inserting a dummy for Southern regions (column II), and to instrumenting financial
development (columns III- V).
In principles, these differences in the entry of new firms and the degree of competition
could also be attributed to geographical clustering in industry specialization. Suppose that certain
areas of the country are specialized in industries or segment of industries where the optimal firm
size is small. Then, in these areas we would observe more firms, more competition, and also more
entry, since barriers to entry are smaller when the optimal size of a firm is smaller. This could
explain why these characteristics are positively correlated in the data, but why are they positively
correlated with financial development? If this is the direction of causation we should find a strong
negative correlation between financial development and firm’s size.23
  This is what we do in Table 7. We measure size as the logarithm of sales. We regress it
on our indicator of financial development, eighteen industry dummies, calendar year dummies,
per capita GDP, and level of economic delinquency, and firms’ profitability. This latter variable
is obviously endogenous. Removing it, however, does not change our results.
As Table 7 shows, the results are very mixed. In four out of five specifications the
estimated coefficient of financial development is negative, but is statistically significant in only
two. Thus, geographical clustering in optimal firm size is unlikely to be the driving force behind
our results.
In sum, we have looked at the effect of financial development on entry from very
different points of views: from the micro point of view -- the occupational choice; from the macro
point of view -- the number of new and existing firms; and from the industrial organization point
of view -- lower profits margins. From all these different angles a consistent picture emerges:
financial development facilitates entry.
3. Effects of financial development on firms’ growth
Finally, we explore whether the local level of financial development affects firms’ rate of
growth. Existing firms can, at least in part, finance growth via internally generated cash. Thus, we
expect financial development to have an impact only on the growth in excess of the one that
could be internally financed. Following Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), we compute the
maximum rate of internally financed growth and then use it as a control variable in the regression.
This rate is obtained following the “percentage of sales” approach to financial planning (Higgins,
1977).  Under reasonable assumptions, the maximum rate of growth internally financed is:
Max g = ROA/ (1 – ROA)
where ROA is the return on assets.
9
                                               
9 The assumptions are: i) the ratio of assets used in production to sales is constant; ii) the firm’s profit rate
for unit of sales is constant; iii) the economic deprecation of assets equals that reported in the financial
statements; iv) all the profits are reinvested.24
The dependent variable is the annual nominal rate of growth in sales. Besides the
maximum rate of growth that could be internally financed, our explanatory variables include:
firm’s size, a dummy for the industry a firm belongs to, the level of economic delinquency, the
GDP per capita in the province and, of course, our regional indicator of financial development. A
full set of calendar year dummies account for any aggregate shock to nominal sales growth,
including inflation.
As Table 8 shows, local financial development has a positive and statistically significant
effect on firm’s growth. Ceteris paribus, a firm located in the most financially developed region
grows 6 percentage points faster than a firm located in the least financially developed region, i.e.
67% faster than the average firm. Thus, the effect is very sizeable also from an economic point of
view. When we insert a dummy for Southern regions (column II) the economic magnitude of this
effect is reduced by 18%, but it remains statistically significant at the 1% level.  When we
instrument the indicator of financial development with alternative measures of financial
development (column III) or with our measures of court inefficiency (column IV), the magnitude
of the coefficient increases by 50% and remains highly statistically significant. A similar result
emerges if we use both court inefficiency and social capital as instruments (column V).
Effects on aggregate growth
Since we have seen that financial development fosters the entry of new firms and the growth
of the existing ones, it should also have an impact on the aggregate rate of growth. We test this
prediction in Table 9. We measure growth as the rate of growth of per capita GDP in a province
between 1989 and 1997. Per capita GDP is the per capita net disposable income in the province in
million liras. In the tradition of the growth regressions (see Barro (1991)), we control for several
factors: the beginning of the period (1989) GDP per capita; the quality of infrastructure present in
a province at the beginning of the period (measured as the availability of infrastructure in the
province as of 1987); the level of human capital, measured as the average years of schooling in25
the province in 1981; and the population growth, which is the growth of population between 1989
and 1997.
After controlling for all these variables, the level of financial development has a positive and
statistically significant impact on growth (column I). The effect is also economically sizeable.
Moving from the least to the most financially developed region boosts the growth rate by 1.2
percentage point a year. This effect is robust to inserting a control for Southern regions (column
II).
Interestingly, when we instrument our indicator of financial development with other measures
of ease of access to external funds (diffusion of usury and importance of local banks in the credit
market), the effect triples in size (column III). This seems to suggest that the noisiness of our
indicator of financial development tends to bias downward our estimate of the impact of financial
development on growth.
In columns III and IV we re-estimate the basic specification instrumenting our indicator of
financial development for the exogenous factors that affect the degree of development of a
country financial system. When we use as instrument our measures of efficiency of the judicial
system, the IV estimate is almost identical to the OLS one. When we instrument using our two
measures of social capital and control for the third one in the regression, the effect slightly drops
in size and loses statistical significance (column IV). But if we use both sets of instrument
together, the impact remains statistically significant (not reported).
In sum, the data seems to confirm that the micro effects we have documented have
also an impact at the macro level. An interesting and unexplored question is how much
these differences in financial development can explain regional differences in economic
development. To assess the potential important of this factor in an unreported regression
we relate the level of per capita GDP in a province to the local level of financial
development, instrumented with our measures of social capital. Not only local financial26
development has a positive and statistically significant effect, its magnitude is also
economically very relevant. The entire difference in per capita income between Milan
and Rome – about 50% - could be explained by the difference in their local levels of
financial development.  Of course, many other factors play a role. Nevertheless, this is
further evidence that local financial development matters.
4. Sample Splits
Theoretically, we do not expect all firms to be equally affected by local financial
development. Larger firms can more easily tap markets far from their main headquarters.
Therefore, we expect the effect of local financial development to be mostly concentrated among
small firms. To test this proposition we divide the sample in four. The first group is composed of
small firms, with less than 67 employees. We chose this cut off because it represents the 75
th
percentile of firm’s distribution. The second group is composed of what in Italy we would call
medium firms, with a number of employees between 67 and 275 (the 95
th percentile of the
distribution). Large firms, those with more than 275 employees, form the third group. Finally, we
isolate a group of really large firms, more than 500 employees.
Table 10 reports the results of these sample splits. Table 10a reports the mark-up
regressions. As expected, the effect of financial development on mark up seems to be present
only among small and medium firms. The effect is quantitatively much smaller (only one third)
and not statistically significant for large and very large firms.
Table 10b reports the sample splits for the growth regressions. Not surprisingly, small
firms, which represent 75% of the sample, behave as the sample as a whole (column I). More
interestingly, the impact of financial development on growth is 29% lower in medium firms than
in small firms and 67% lower in large firms than in small firms. As to be expected, the impact of
financial development on very large firms is zero, both economically and statistically.27
These results on size are consistent with Berger et al. (2001) and Petersen and Rajan
(2002) that find that small firms are less likely to borrow at a distance making them more
dependent from the level of local financial development.
These results are interesting for two reasons. First, that the effect of financial
development varies as theory predicts strengthen the confidence that our results are not spurious.
Second, it suggests that the effects of local financial development are limited to small firms. This
is important from a political economy point of view (see Rajan and Zingales, 2001). Large and
established firms do not get any benefit from local financial development; in fact they are hurt,
because it increases the competition at the local level. Thus, they are not very likely to push for it.
The real beneficiaries are small firms and would be entrepreneurs, a group who is hardly very
influential at the political level.
5.  Conclusions
Financial markets are becoming increasingly integrated throughout the world. Does this mean
that domestic financial institutions become irrelevant? Our paper suggests not. We show that even
in a country (Italy) that has been fully integrated (not only politically, but also in term of
regulation) for the last 140 years local financial development still matters. Therefore, domestic
financial institutions are likely to remain important in a financially integrated Europe and, more
broadly, in a financially integrated world for time to come.
Our evidence also suggests that, as predicted by theory, local financial development is
differentially important for large and small firms. Not only does this result support the existence
of a causal link between local financial development and real economic variables, but it also
raises some questions on the economic effects of financial integration. As Europe and the world
are becoming more integrated, large firms will become increasingly uninterested of the conditions
of the local financial system, while small firms will continue to rely on it. Hence, depending on
the initial size distribution of firms and the minimum threshold to access foreign capital markets,28
the political support in favor of domestic financial markets might vanish or strengthen as the
world becomes more financially integrated. Policy makers working at the European integration
should seriously consider this effect, which might explain the persistent underdevelopment of
vast areas in Italy 140 years after unification.29
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Table 1. Summary statistics for the samples used in estimation
Panel A reports summary statistics for the households at risk of being rationed in the SHIW. This includes all the
households that have received loans and households that have been denied a loan or discouraged from borrowing; Panel
B reports summary statistics for the individuals in the SHIW (most households have more than one individual). Panel C
reports summary statistics for the controls and instrumental variables used at provincial level. Panel D reports summary
statistics for the firms’ balance sheet database, Panel E for the Survey of Manufacturing Firms. Credit rationed is a
dummy variable equal to one if an household responds positively to at least one of the following questions: ``During
the year did you or a member of the household think of applying for a loan or a mortgage to a bank or other financial
intermediary, but then changed your mind on the expectation that the application would have been turned down?"
"During the year did you or a member of the household apply for a loan or a mortgage to a bank or other financial
intermediary and your application was turned down?." Age is the age of the household head in the household sample
and the age of the individual in the individual sample. Male is a dummy variable equal to one if the household head or
the individual is a male. Years of education is the number of years a person attended school. Net disposable income is
in millions liras. Wealth is financial and real wealth net of household debt in millions liras.  South is a dummy equal to
one if the household lives in a region south of Rome. Entrepreneurs 1 includes entrepreneurs, both in the industrial and
retail sectors, professionals (doctors and lawyers), and artisans. Entrepreneurs 2 includes only entrepreneurs, both in the
industrial and retail sectors. Intergenerational transfer is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a household received transfers
from their parents. Financial development is our indicator of access to credit (see Table 2). Per capita GDP is the per
capita net disposable income in the province in millions of liras. Court inefficiency 1 is the number of years it takes to
have a first-degree judgment. Court inefficiency 2 is the number of cases without judgment on the population.
Economic delinquency is number of criminal prosecutions filed by banks for repeated issuance of checks with
insufficient funds scaled by population and measured at the provincial level. Social capital (referenda turnout) is the
average participation to national referenda (1946-1989), measured at the provincial level. Blood donation is number of
bag of blood donated for inhabitant in the province of residence of the individual. Cooperatives is from Putnam (1993)
and it is a factor score summarizing the regional number of cooperatives, standardized by population, in 1889, 1901,
1910, and 1915. Firms’ creation is the fraction of the new firms registered in a province during a year over the total
number of registered firms (average1992-98, source ISTAT). Number of firms present per 100 people living in the
same area is from ISTAT (average 1996-98). Usury diffusion index is an indicator of the pervasiveness of usury
computed by a parliamentary commission using 17 variables, including the number of police reports, apprehensions for
usury etc. Number of employees is the number of employees measured at the firm level (average across years).  Sales
growth is the growth in nominal sales. Mark-up is profit on sales. Leverage is book debt over the sum of book debt plus
book equity. Average collection period is average accounts receivable  (moving average across two periods) scaled by
sales and multiplied by 365. South is a dummy equal to one if the firm is located in a region south of Rome. Ownership








Credit rationed 0.137 0.00 0.344 0 1
Age 45.00 46.27 11.82 25 76
Male 0.85 1.00 0.352 0 1
Years of education 9.69 8.00 4.34 0 18
Net disposable income 47 41 33 6 155
Wealth 243 149 367 -19 1,634
South 0.359  0.00 0.480 0 1
Number of observations 8,119








Entrepreneurs 1 0.14 0.00 0.35 0 1
Entrepreneurs 2 0.03 0.00 0.16 0 1
 Age 39 39.00 11.90 16 59
Male 0.49 0.00 0.50 0 1
Years of education 9.70 8.00 4.18 0 18
Wealth 272 158 559 -6 1,893
Dummy if they have
received transfers from
their parents
0.12 0.00 0.33 0 1
Resident in the South 0.39 0.00 0.49 0 1
Number of observations 50,59034
C: Provincial variables







 Financial development 0.28 0.32 0.13 0 0.50
GDP per capita (millions
liras)
25.35 24.16 10.62 12.17 54.76
Judicial inefficiency 1 3.79 3.49 1.43 1.66 7.89
Judicial inefficiency 2 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.2 0.11
Economic delinquency 0.99 0.84 0.61 0.17 2.86
Social capital (referenda
turnout)
80.02 83.02 8.42 62.1 90.82
Blood donation 28.04 23.91 21.68 0 79.54
Cooperatives 1889-1915 0.00 0.36 1 -1.11 2.34
Usury diffusion index 927.59 723.00 447.67 196.00 2,002
Firms creation per 100
inhabitants
1.14 1.12 0.34 0.53 1.95
Number of firms per 100
inhabitants
9.18 9.02 1.55 6.17 12.77
D: Firm level data: Firms Balance Sheet Database







Number of employees 103.33 32.00 1,167 2 970
Sales growth 0.074 0.073 0.25 0.706 -0.685
Assets/sales 1.086 0.768 1.43 0.164 15.40
Mark-up 0.058 0.055 0.095 - 0.296 0.335
Return on assets 0.078 0.075 0.091 - 0.186 0.349
Leverage 0.506 0.548 0.297 0 0.985
Average collection period 129.41 97.58 171.52 3.54 923.58
South 0.134 0.00 0.34 0  1
N. Observations 326,59035
Table 2. The indicator of financial development
The table illustrates our indicator of financial development. The coefficient on the
regional dummies is obtained from an OLS regression estimated using a subset of the
household in SHIW. This subset includes (a) households that have received a loan, (b)
households that have been turned down for a loan, (c) households that are discouraged
from borrowing. The left hand side variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a household is credit
constrained (i.e., declares it has been turned down for a loan or discouraged from
applying) and zero otherwise. Besides including a full set of regional dummies, the
regression, includes a number of demographic characteristics to controls for individual
effects that affect access to the credit market (age, gender, type of job, income, family
size, number of income recipients in the household), and a control for the percentage of
bankruptcies in the area. The letter on the right on the name of the region defines whether
a region is located in the North (north of Florence), in the Center (between Florence and
Rome) or in the South (south of Rome). The normalized measure is defined as 1 –
Regional effect / Max {Regional effect} and is thus equal to zero in the region with the
maximum value of the coefficient on the regional dummy – i.e. the region less financially
developed, and varies between zero and 1.
Region Coefficient on regional dummy Normalized measure of financial
development
Marche (C) 0.126974 0.502711
Liguria (N) 0.149193 0.415693
Veneto (N) 0.152252 0.403711
Basilicata (S) 0.152283 0.403588
Emilia (N) 0.159136 0.376752
Sardegna (S) 0.164811 0.354525
Piemonte (N) 0.166695 0.347145
Friuli ven. (N) 0.168796 0.338919
Abruzzo (S) 0.169333 0.336813
Trentino (N) 0.173149 0.32187
Lombardia (N) 0.17958 0.296682
Umbria (C) 0.183417 0.281653
Toscana (C) 0.185195 0.274692
Sicilia (S) 0.197365 0.227028
Molise (S) 0.199661 0.218035
Puglia (S) 0.213902 0.162261
Lazio (C) 0.243147 0.047723
Calabria (S) 0.243169 0.04764
Campania (S) 0.255333 036
Table 3. Entrepreneurship and financial development
The left hand-side variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is self-employed. In Panel A this category
includes entrepreneurs, both in the industrial and retail sectors, professionals (doctors and lawyers), and
artisans. In Panel B this category includes only entrepreneurs, both in the industrial and retail sectors. IV-1
uses as instrument usury and the fraction of local bank lending over total lending in the province. IV-2 uses as
instruments two measures of judicial inefficiency (court inefficiency 1 is the number of years it takes to have a
first-degree judgment and court inefficiency 2 is the number of cases without judgment on the population). IV-
3 uses as instrument the two measures of judicial inefficiency and two measures of social capital (electoral
turnout, blood donation). Financial development is our indicator of access to credit (see Table 2). Per capita
GDP is the per capita net disposable income in the province in million liras. Intergenerational transfer is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if a household received transfers from their parents. Male is a dummy equal to one
if the individual is a male. Years of education are the number of years a person attended school. Economic
delinquency is the number of criminal prosecutions filed by banks for repeated issuance of checks with
insufficient funds. Age is the age of the individual. South is a dummy equal to one for regions south of Rome.
Cooperatives is from Putnam (1993) and it is a factor score summarizing the regional number of cooperatives,
standardized by population, in 1889, 1901, 1910, and 1915. Standard errors, which are reported in brackets,
are adjusted for clustering at the regional level. (***): coefficient significant at less than 1%; (**): coefficient
significant at the 1%; (*): coefficient significant at the 5%.
Panel A
Probit Probit OLS IV-1 IV –2 IV – 3
Financial Development 0.1212*** 0.1083*** 0.1137*** 0.1581** 0.1337** 0.1369**
(0.0299) (0.0353) (0.0330) (0.0602) (0.0480) (0.0502)
Per Capita GDP/1000 0.0499 -0.1057 -0.1141 -0.0991 -0.1074 0.0200
(0.2539) (0.3021) (0.3032) (0.3154) (0.3080) (0.2688)
Intergenerational transfers 0.0817*** 0.0818*** 0.0892*** 0.0891*** 0.0892*** 0.0891***
(0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0135)
Male 0.0999*** 0.0999*** 0.1014*** 0.1014*** 0.1014*** 0.1008***
(0.0098) (0.0100) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0105)
Economic delinquency -0.0076 -0.0060 -0.0070 -0.0099 -0.0083 -0.0121
(0.0087) (0.0092) (0.0091) (0.0088) (0.0105) (0.0109)
Years of education -0.0072*** -0.0073*** -0.0073*** -0.0073*** -0.0073*** -0.0077***
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011)
Age 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0016***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
South -0.0083 -0.0040 0.0034 -0.0006 0.0325*
(0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0161) (0.0125) (0.0180)
Cooperatives per capita 1889-1915 0.0150**
(0.0069)
Observations 13908 13908 13908 13908 13908 1251937
Panel B
Probit Probit OLS IV-1 IV -2 IV – 3
Financial Development 0.0270 0.0340* 0.0430** 0.0132 0.0380 0.0601
(0.0165) (0.0186) (0.0198) (0.0426) (0.0319) (0.0360)
Per Capita GDP/1000 -0.0797 0.0062 0.0137 0.0030 0.0119 0.0747
(0.1341) (0.1904) (0.2030) (0.2114) (0.2011) (0.1969)
Intergenerational transfers 0.0626*** 0.0625*** 0.0745*** 0.0746*** 0.0745*** 0.0758***
(0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0092) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0102)
Male 0.0721*** 0.0721*** 0.0760*** 0.0760*** 0.0760*** 0.0750***
(0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0104)
Economic delinquency -0.0013 -0.0022 -0.0024 -0.0003 -0.0020 -0.0046
(0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0047) (0.0052) (0.0056) (0.0059)
Years of education -0.0053*** -0.0052*** -0.0058*** -0.0058*** -0.0058*** -0.0062***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009)
Age 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0011***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
South 0.0046 0.0093 0.0043 0.0084 0.0114
(0.0063) (0.0066) (0.0102) (0.0064) (0.0141)
Cooperatives per capita 1889-1915 -0.0014
(0.0070)
Observations 13103 13103 13103 13103 13103 1183038
Table 4. Self employed age and local financial development
The dependent variable is the average age of the self employed in the province, calculated only including the
entrepreneurs, both in the industrial and retail sectors. Financial development is our indicator of access to credit
(see Table 2). Per capita GDP is the per capita net disposable income in the province in million liras. South is a
dummy equal to one for regions south of Rome. Cooperatives is from Putnam (1993) and it is a factor score
summarizing the regional number of cooperatives, standardized by population, in 1889, 1901, 1910, and 1915. IV-
1 uses as instrument usury and the fraction of local bank lending over total lending in the province. IV-2 uses as
instruments two measures of judicial inefficiency (court inefficiency 1 is the number of years it takes to have a
first-degree judgment and court inefficiency 2 is the number of cases without judgment on the population). IV-3
uses as instrument the two measures of judicial inefficiency and two measures of social capital (electoral turnout,
blood donation). Standard errors are reported in brackets. (***): coefficient significant at less than 1%; (**):
coefficient significant at the 1%; (*): coefficient significant at the 5%.
.
OLS OLS IV-1 IV-2 IV-3
Financial Development -10.9353*** -9.2814** -0.5499 -10.5576** -9.6894**
(3.2089) (3.6413) (8.0383) (4.2291) (4.3358)
Per Capita GDP/1000 94.6902** 132.3467** 119.5347** 134.2192** 138.6885***
(36.1046) (47.4411) (53.2137) (47.9727) (46.5511)
South 1.6712 2.4526 1.5569 0.1320
(1.3374) (1.6932) (1.2789) (1.6824)
Cooperatives per capita 1889-1915 -0.8707
(0.5174)
Observations 92 92 92 92 82
R-squared 0.081 0.097 0.058 0.096 0.10439
Table 5. Firms’ creation and local financial development
In Panel A the dependent variable is the fraction of the new firms registered in a province during a year
scaled by population. It is an average for the period 1992-98. In Panel B the dependent variable is the
number of firms located in a province per 100 people living in the same area. It is an average for the
period 1996-98. Per capita GDP is the per capita net disposable income in the province in million liras.
Delinquency is the number of criminal prosecutions filed by banks for repeated issuance of checks with
insufficient funds. South is a dummy equal to one for regions south of Rome. Cooperatives is from
Putnam (1993) and it is a factor score summarizing the regional number of cooperatives, standardized
by population, in 1889, 1901, 1910, and 1915. IV-1 uses as instruments two measures of judicial
inefficiency (the level of court inefficiency is the number of years it takes to have a first-degree
judgment and the number of cases without judgment on the population). IV-2 uses as instrument two
measures of social capital (electoral turnout, blood donation). Standard errors, reported in brackets, are
adjusted for regional clustering. (***): Coefficient significant at less than 1%; (**): coefficient
significant at the 1%; (*): coefficient significant at the 5%.
A: Entry of new firms
OLS OLS IV-1 IV-2 IV-3
Financial Development 95.034*** 76.685*** 117.187** 67.196* 87.512**
(22.917) (18.585) (45.341) (36.03) (36.725)
Per capita GDP/1000 -0.795** -1.1*** -1.119*** -1.1*** -1.16***
(0.337) (0.329) (0.360) (0.322) (0.310)
Economic delinquency -5.021 -3.016 -3.908 -2.807 -3.484
(3.045) (3.525) (3.670) (3.562) (3.733)
South -14.602* -9.595 -15.775* -10.572
(8.145) (10.152) (8.651) (14.374)
Cooperatives 1889-1915 2.714
(6.899)
Observations 100 100 100 100 94
R-squared 0.133 0.155 0.139 0.154 0.172
B: Number of firms per capita in the region
OLS OLS IV-1 IV-2 IV-3
Financial Development 5.649*** 3.996*** 5.483** 2.95 3.896*
(1.741) (1.124) (2.552) (1.972) (1.858)
Per capita GDP/1000 0.0183 -0.010 -0.102 -0.009 -0.0129
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Economic delinquency -0.146 0.034 0.002 0.058 0.017
(0.162) (0.191) (0.170) (0.198) (0.196)
South -1.315*** -1.131** -1.444*** -1.156**
(0.345) (0.414) (0.333) (0.465)
Cooperatives 1889-1915 0.168
(0.233)
Observations 100 100 100 100 94
R-squared 0.264 0.351 0.34 0.346 0.3940
Table 6. Firms market power and financial development     
The left hand-side variable is a measure of the market power of the firm. Following Domowitz, Hubbard and
Petersen [1986] we compute the firm’s profit margin on unit price as (value added - labor costs)/(total income
+ change in stocks); for a price-setting firm with constant returns to scale, the lower the elasticity of demand
the higher the margin and thus its market power. All regressions include a full set of time and industry
dummies; firm size is measured with the number of employees. IV-1 uses as instrument usury and the fraction
of local bank lending over total lending in the province. IV-2 uses as instrument the average provincial length
of trials and the average number of pending trials in a region. IV-3 includes also two indicators of social
capital, blood donation and electoral turnout. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are adjusted for regional
clustering. (***): coefficient significant at less than 1%; (**): coefficient significant at the 1%; (*): coefficient
significant at the 5%.

















































N. of Coops - - - - -0.0001
(0.0009)
N. Obs. 296,846 296,846 296,846 296,846 296,846
Adj. R-square 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.02041
Table 7. The effect of financial development on firms’ size
The left hand-side variable is the logarithm of sales. All regressions include time and industry
dummies; profit is return on assets. IV-1 uses as instrument usury and the fraction of local bank
lending over total lending in the province. IV-2 uses as instrument the average provincial length
of trials and the average number of pending trials in a region. IV-3 includes also two indicators of
social capital, blood donation and electoral turnout. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are
adjusted for regional clustering. (***): coefficient significant at less than 1%; (**): coefficient
significant at the 1%; (*): coefficient significant at the 5%.











Per capita GDP/1000 9.68e-03
(   2.40e-03)
6.51e-03



































N. of coops - - - - 0.0492
(0.0374)
N. Obs. 325,608 325,608 325,608 325,608 325,608
Adj R-square 0.138 0.142 0.1394 0.142 0.14642
Table 8. The effect of financial development on firms’ growth 
The left hand-side variable is the annual rate of growth in sales. All regressions include industry
and time dummies. IV-1 uses as instrument usury and the fraction of local bank lending over total
lending in the province. IV-2 uses as instrument the average provincial length of trials and the
average number of pending trials in a region. IV-3 includes also two indicators of social capital,
blood donation and electoral turnout. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are adjusted for
regional clustering. (***): coefficient significant at less than 1%; (**): coefficient significant at
the 1%; (*): coefficient significant at the 5%.





























































N. of coops - - - - 0.0014
(0.0019)
N. Obs. 252,101 252,101 252,101 252,101 252,101
Adj R-square 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.05143
Table 9. Local growth and financial development
The dependent variable is the rate of growth of per capita GDP between 1989 and 1997. Financial
development is our indicator of access to credit (see Table 2). Per capita GDP is the per capita net
disposable income in the province in million liras. Infrastructure is an indicator of the level of infrastructure
at the provincial level in 1987. Average schooling is the average years of schooling in the province in 1981.
Population growth is the growth of population between 1989 and 1997. South is a dummy equal to one for
regions south of Rome. Cooperatives is from Putnam (1993) and it is a factor score summarizing the
regional number of cooperatives, standardized by population, in 1889, 1901, 1910, and 1915. IV-1 uses as
instrument usury and the fraction of local bank lending over total lending in the province. IV-2 uses as
instruments two measures of judicial inefficiency (court inefficiency 1 is the number of years it takes to
have a first-degree judgment and court inefficiency 2 is the number of cases without judgment on the
population). IV-3 uses as instrument the two measures of judicial inefficiency and two measures of social
capital (electoral turnout, blood donation). (***): coefficient significant at less than 1%; (**): coefficient
significant at the 1%; (*): coefficient significant at the 5%.
OLS OLS IV-1 IV-2 IV-3
Financial Development 0.0240** 0.0224*** 0.0673*** 0.0256** 0.0171
(0.0100) (0.0078) (0.0205) (0.0118) (0.0105)
Per capita GDP/1000 in 1989 -0.0025*** -0.0031*** -0.0030*** -0.0031*** -0.0034***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Infrastructures in 1987 0.0001* 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Average schooling in 1981 0.0053** 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 0.0053**
(0.0027) (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0024)
Population growth -0.0001 0.0002 0.0008* 0.0002 0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003)
South -0.0206*** -0.0202*** -0.0206*** -0.0142***
(0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0027) (0.0039)
Cooperatives per capita 1889-1915 0.0033*
(0.0018)
Observations 93 93 93 93 81
R-squared 0.369 0.621 0.674 0.620 0.67344
Table 10.  Sample splits by firm size 
In panel A the left hand-side variable is a measure of the market power of the firm (see notes to
Table 6).  In Panel B it is the average collection period, defined as the average level of account
receivables (sum of beginning of period and end of period stock divided by 2) scaled by sales and
multiplied by 365. In Panel C a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm is 100% owned by one
shareholder. Small firms have less than 67 employees; medium firms between 67 and 275; large
firms more than 275 and very large firms more than 500. Regressions include industry dummies,
time dummies (where appropriate). All regressions are IV estimates using as instruments the
average length of trials in a province and the number of pending trials per inhabitant in the area.
Results are the same if the other instruments sets described in the text are used. Standard errors,
reported in brackets, are adjusted for regional clustering. (***): coefficient significant at less than
1%; (**): coefficient significant at the 1%; (*): coefficient significant at the 5%.
Panel A: firm’s mark up 









































N. Obs. 224,579 58,168 14,099 6,294
Adj. R-square 0.024 0.023 0.031 0.047
Panel B: firm’s growth









































N. Obs. 177,454 51,032 13,615 6,397
Adj.  R-square 0.062 0.064 0.069 0.068